Post by arfanho7 on Feb 23, 2024 21:10:33 GMT -6
Consequently managers in these settings often face a tradeoff between making an optimal decision and sending a favorable signal. We provide experimental evidence on the choices made by decision makers in such settings. Equilibrium assumptions that are commonly applied to analyze these situations yield the least cost separating outcome as the unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium the more informed party undertakes a costly signal to resolve the information asymmetry that exists.
We provide evidence however that participants are much more likely to pursue a pooling outcome when such an outcome is available. This result is important for research and practice because pooling and separating outcomes can yield dramatically different results and have divergent implications. to pool is influenced by changes in the Egypt WhatsApp Number List underlying newsvendor model parameters in our setting. In robustness tests we show that choosing a pooling outcome is especially pronounced among participants who report a high level of understanding of the setting and that participants who pool are rewarded by the less informed party with higher payoffs.
Finally we demonstrate through a reexamination of Lai et al. and Cachon and Lariviere how pooling outcomes can substantively extend the implications of other extant signaling game models in the operations management literature. Publisher s link hbs.edu faculty Pages item.aspx num Incentives versus Reciprocity Insights from a Field Experiment By Chung Doug J. and Das Narayandas ABSTRACT—We conduct a field experiment in which we vary the sales force compensation scheme at an Asian enterprise that sells consumer durable goods.
We provide evidence however that participants are much more likely to pursue a pooling outcome when such an outcome is available. This result is important for research and practice because pooling and separating outcomes can yield dramatically different results and have divergent implications. to pool is influenced by changes in the Egypt WhatsApp Number List underlying newsvendor model parameters in our setting. In robustness tests we show that choosing a pooling outcome is especially pronounced among participants who report a high level of understanding of the setting and that participants who pool are rewarded by the less informed party with higher payoffs.
Finally we demonstrate through a reexamination of Lai et al. and Cachon and Lariviere how pooling outcomes can substantively extend the implications of other extant signaling game models in the operations management literature. Publisher s link hbs.edu faculty Pages item.aspx num Incentives versus Reciprocity Insights from a Field Experiment By Chung Doug J. and Das Narayandas ABSTRACT—We conduct a field experiment in which we vary the sales force compensation scheme at an Asian enterprise that sells consumer durable goods.
